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ROGER TANEY: INTERSECTIONAL RACIST
IN AN AGE OF RACIST DIFFERENTIATION
Michael Haggerty* & Gregory P. Downs**
INTRODUCTION
In his article Dred Scott and Asian Americans, Gabriel J. Chin creatively
and persuasively reads the well-known, much-reviled opinion by Chief
Justice Roger Taney in Dred Scott v. Sandford through Taney’s little-known
opinion in United States v. Dow to argue that Dred Scott “should be regarded
as pertinent to all people of color, not only African Americans.”1 Through
Professor Chin’s incisive reading of Dow, Taney emerges as deeply engaged
not just in the specific question of African Americans’ rights but in a broader
project of defining a “Christian white person” as part of a “master” race.2
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Taney established historical and legal justifications for excluding non-white
Christians from membership in the United States political community, those
people with rights that others are required to respect. Chin’s argument raises
broad questions about the history and historiography of Asian exclusion, the
impact of the Civil War and Reconstruction on constitutional and political
history, and Taney’s reputation in the early twentieth century, among many
other issues.
What most interests us are two other, related points: first, Taney’s vision
of an interconnected history of the rights of “Christian white” people; second,
Chin’s argument that Taney “is entitled to attention” as
an historian, and as a legal realist describing the law as it actually was . . . .
not only before, but for at least a century after the Civil War. Taney’s work
makes clear that like African Americans, Asians, Native Americans and
other non-whites had no rights the law was bound to respect.3

In this Essay we primarily address those two points: first, Taney as a
proponent and defender of interconnected, even intersectional, racial
ideologies; and second, Taney’s representativeness as an historian and as a
legal realist describing law and politics as they were. In Professor Chin’s first
claim, about the interconnected nature of Taney’s racial thought, we find a
fascinating insight into the construction of a predominantly Democratic
vision of the white race that helped shape not only Taney’s jurisprudence,
but also his party’s efforts to develop a constructed identity politics. Professor
Chin’s focus on the Naturalization Act of 1790 is a powerful rejoinder to
many early U.S. historical narratives that examine race making solely with
regard to people already in what became the United States. Taney’s
arguments about a white Christian master race in turn help center nonwhiteness, not just Blackness or indigeneity, in early U.S. history with
profound consequences. These are major claims and major contributions.4
But we are not completely convinced by Professor Chin’s claims about
Taney as a reliable historian or as a legal realist. In the second half of the
essay, we suggest that Taney’s position should be read as one among a series
of contextual, contested positions that emerged in the second quarter of the
nineteenth century. Politicians and activists deployed this intersectional
racism against political opponents who used other forms of exclusionist but
particularist racial categorizations, what we call racist differentiation, as well
3
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as against a growing, even threatening, effort to construct potentially, if
imperfectly, anti-racist arguments about citizenship and belonging by Black
activists and some white allies. Setting Taney’s opinions briefly within
historical practices of context, sequence, conflict, and contingency, we hope
to capture the power and also relative distinctiveness of Taney’s efforts to
develop an interconnected, perhaps intersectional, racism. We don’t argue
that Taney was wrong and that another single position on race and early
U.S. history was right. Taney’s intersectional racism constitutes one crucial,
and under-appreciated strand of early American history with important
ramifications for national narratives. But a history of the period must also be
attentive to ideas and people Taney pretended to ignore but actually argued
against: the more recently documented efforts of Black activists in the early
national period, including in his own Maryland, as well as Taney’s political
opponents who defended other forms of exclusionist legal and political
thinking.
INTERSECTIONALISM AND THE IRONIES OF ROGER TANEY
Before proceeding into the argument, we should explain our use of the
language of intersectionality. We mean the term ironically in two respects,
one centered on Taney’s attentions to race, another on his inattention to
gender. Developed from the broader Critical Race Theory scholarship that
Professor Johnson analyzes in his response, intersectionalism emerged in the
work of Kimberlé Crenshaw. Crenshaw’s work centered the world of Black
women and the scholarship of Black feminism to illustrate, in broad terms,
that race and gender were not distinct identities, experienced in isolation, but
instead intertwined, intersecting, and often interdependent identities. Thus,
race could not be untangled without reference to gender, nor gender without
reference to race, nor could people be reduced to a single identity that
purportedly explained their interests and experiences; they had to be
understood at the intersection of several, sometimes mutually constructing
identities. This raises one immediate irony with Taney’s racial theorizing,
one that will be explored more coherently in other articles: the complete
silence on Taney’s views of gender, at least as portrayed in Professor Chin’s
article and in much of the scholarship on Dred Scott. Taney in this respect
represents an anti-intersectionalist viewpoint in that gender disappears
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entirely from the portrayal of race, even though race was constructed, by
definition in the United States, through women’s bodies.5
In another respect, Taney’s connections are familiar to those who have
followed the trajectory of intersectionality from Crenshaw’s initial arguments
to the more wide-ranging uses in academia, activism, and pop culture today.
Often, the term is used now to refer to the ways that seemingly distinct types
of exclusions are constructed within and upon each other; thus intersectional
theory (and intersectional slogans) help build a collective project for excluded
people by helping them articulate the ideology that they contest against. This
raises the second irony in characterizing Taney’s position as intersectional:
his intentions differed dramatically from contemporary users of the term.
Crenshaw and contemporary users construct allyships and arguments to
undo intersectional racisms and sexisms.
Taney, of course, wrote with the opposite intention in Dow and Dred Scott:
to construct a racism broad enough to combine Black people with other nonwhite people in order to exclude and oppress them more effectively. In
Chin’s analysis, Taney provides irresistibly useful proof of the concept of
intersectionalism, a textbook example of its claims. As Taney proves the
power of Critical Race Theory in Professor Johnson’s essay, so too does he
prove the validity of intersectionalism. If it seems ungenerous to use the
important, meaningful word intersectional in this ironic fashion, we
participate in what Crenshaw has acknowledged, ruefully, is the multifaceted use of the word and its rise as a charismatic concept, and we believe
that Chin’s argument, read this way, may prove useful to those who argue
for the intersectional history of race. Writing Taney into the long history of
intertwined, intersectional racism makes visible, even self-evident, key facts
about the power of intersectional racism in shaping U.S. history.6

5

6

On intersectionality and its relationship to Black feminist thought, see PATRICIA HILL COLLINS,
BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE POLITICS OF
EMPOWERMENT 19–40 (Routledge 2008) (1990); Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection
of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics,
1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 139–67 (1989); Kimberlé Crenshaw, Twenty Years of Critical Race
Theory: Looking Back to Move Forward, 43 U. CONN. L. REV. 1253, 1253–352 (2011).
For Crenshaw’s response to the increasingly common use of intersectionality, see Kimberlé
Crenshaw, Race to the Bottom: How the Post-Racial Revolution Became a Whitewash, BAFFLER, June 2017,
at 40, https://www.jstor.org/stable/44466514?refreqid=excelsior%3A66e662f0ea2be765dae8d
c9b9da79ce9&seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents [https://perma.cc/2DHD-Q7GY].

June 2022]

ROGER TANEY: INTERSECTIONAL RACIST

733

CHIN’S ARGUMENTS
Professor Gabriel Chin places Dred Scott v. Sandford within the legal
contexts of immigration and white supremacy. From the Naturalization Act
of 1790 to the horrors of Japanese interment in the mid-twentieth century,
Chin moves beyond the context of the Civil War era to consider how Dred
Scott v. Sandford relates to a broader pattern of legal discrimination against
non-white people. Historians have long interpreted the Dred Scott decision as
a product of the legal and political debates of the antebellum era. Chief
Justice Roger Taney’s assertion that individuals of African descent “had no
rights which the white man was bound to respect” fits neatly within the
broadening political and legal divide between pro- and anti-slavery politics
which drove the United States toward Civil War in the mid-nineteenth
century. Professor Chin, however, asks us to look beyond the context of this
conflict in extremely productive ways.7
As Chin shows, the court’s majority opinion in Dred Scott specifically
references the language of the Naturalization Act of 1790 as a way of
legitimizing the court’s denial of Black citizenship. According to the
language of this act, citizenship was confined to “aliens being free white
persons.”8 This reliance upon the status of foreign individuals to determine
the racial limits of legal and political rights was a pattern in Taney’s decision
making.
Chin brilliantly excavates Taney’s use of the same rationale in a U.S.
Circuit Court case, United States v. Dow, penned seventeen years before Dred
Scott. In both Dow and Dred Scott, Taney insisted that a white supremacist
standard for naturalization was an appropriate means for determining
whether or not an individual should be extended legal rights or privileges;
racial distinctions made in regard to people outside the country’s borders
were meaningful ways to interpret their rights inside the country’s borders,
in Taney’s formation. In the Dow case, Taney handed down his decision in
Maryland, and relied on the region’s history to justify his conclusion that
Malay individuals were of an inferior race. Taney insisted that colonial
officials in Maryland regarded only European nations as “civilized.” Thus,
as a Malay individual from Manila, Dow could not be considered a member
of the white race and need not be extended legal privileges. 9
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Although Black individuals would not have been allowed to testify against
a white person, Taney determined that, as a Malay individual, Dow was of a
race of people who could legally be enslaved. Thus, he refused to grant Dow
an exception of evidence because he was not of “the race of which the masters
were composed.” Ultimately, the Black sailors were allowed to testify, and
Dow was convicted of a capital offense. By tracing the application of slave
law to Dow’s case, Chin demonstrates that Lorenzo Dow, much like Dred
Scott, was a victim of Taney’s intersectional approach to the law, though in
Dow with the ironic impact of permitting Black testimony. If Black
individuals were the overwhelming majority of enslaved people in the United
States, and the only people subjected to legal chattel slavery in the republic,
they were not the only people who, by Taney’s formulation, could be
enslaved. That broader group of the enslaveable constituted the other that
helped define the white Christian person who held rights in Taney’s
formulation.10
Emphasizing the importance of the Naturalization Act counters
scholarship that treats early U.S. history as shaped by slavery of African
Americans and theft, displacement and warfare against Native people: twin
(if not always overlapping) projects of enslavement and settler colonialism.
In this narrative other non-white people emerge late and to a game whose
rules have already been defined. Non-white people who are neither Black
nor indigenous surface in early U.S. history as curiosities, or as geographical
exceptions to be resolved through the Treaty of Guadelupe Hidalgo and
subsequent state and territorial acts toward former citizens of Mexico now
incorporated into the United States. In this common narrative, other nonwhites arrive in full force later in the story, after the Civil War and
Reconstruction. Exclusion of Asians in the 1880s in this narrative provides
a model of oppression that is distinct from enslavement and segregation of
Black people and the warfare and forced containment of indigenous
peoples.11
Such a story makes the actual history of Asians in the United States
illegible, as Chin, Beth Lew-Williams, Gordon Chang, and Mae Ngai have
argued. The experience of Asians who stayed and the experiences of their
children not only re-center Asian-American history in earlier eras but also
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help explain the mutually constructed racisms that shaped an early 1900s
segregationist national culture.12
Chin goes farther in opening the story of Asians in U.S. history with the
1790s act, not the 1850s narratives of the U.S. conquest of the Pacific coast
and the arrival of tens of thousands of Asian migrants. Placing Lorenzo Dow
within the history of Asians in North America raises important questions in
U.S. history generally and Asian-American history specifically. Chin
persuasively demonstrates that a strand of important legal and political
thought connected the Naturalization Act to an expansive history of
whiteness and of anti-whiteness. Thus the 1870 Naturalization Act that
eliminated restrictions on “aliens of African nativity” and “persons of African
descent,” but not—despite arguments for expansion—to other non-whites,
was not the beginning of a new era of exclusion but a reaffirmation of the
centrality of Asian and non-white exclusion to the U.S. republic. All
historians should think and teach differently as they consider the sweeping
implications of this argument.13
RACIST DIFFERENTIATION AND ANTI-RACISM IN ANTEBELLUM U.S.
HISTORY
Where we diverge from Chin, then, is not in what we see as the core
elements of his argument about Taney but the place of Taney’s arguments
in the broader history of the United States. No one would doubt that Taney
represented one important strand in U.S. politics and history. Chin’s
argument that some aspects of Taney’s legacy lingered is important, as is the
interesting evidence about Taney’s long-term rhetorical influence on the
many critics who found his phrasing as irresistible as they found his ideas
deplorable. And we would not sign on to historians who would characterize
Dred Scott as a basic error and seek to replace it with a different, correct
version of history. Chin draws on actual connections when he shows the
endurance of Taney’s ideas after his death. Our goal is not to displace a
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bleak continuous history of Taneyism with a Whiggish history of
improvement.
Our goal is to historicize Taney’s arguments in two ways: one, focused
on his contemporary world, one on his relationship to the United States of
fifty or one hundred years later. As historians, we would say that Taney is
worthy of study as a single-minded advocate for one important and
widespread view of the past, but for that reason he should not be read as a
historian, since he discards many basic presumptions of history writing (not
just the ethical or anti-racist ones). Even in his time, scholars (and other
justices) wrote sensitively about context, counter-evidence, sequence, multicausality, and contingency in ways that Taney, as a legal advocate, did not
feel inclined to respect or reproduce. Thus, his work is an exemplar of
advocacy about the past that is interesting for its impact but not for its utility
as history. We do not advance these distinctions to argue that history is
objective or positivist. In fact, the emphases upon context, counter-evidence,
multi-causality, and contingency all indicate that history practitioners have
long been interested in partial, subjective views of the past in relation to the
present. History is always a craft, sometimes an art, never a science in a
common paraphrase of Bernard Bailyn’s formulation. Still, there remain
interesting differences between this non-positivist view of history and the use
of the past for legal advocacy by Taney.14
One challenge with reading Taney as an accurate historian or legal realist
lies in the opposition to his arguments, visible at the time. The Dred Scott
dissents offer alternative readings of history. Based on his own reading of the
state histories, Justice Benjamin Curtis wrote that “it is not true, in point of
fact, that the Constitution was made exclusively by the white race. And that
it was made exclusively for the white race is, in my opinion, not only an
assumption not warranted by anything in the Constitution, but contradicted
by its opening declaration.” Justice John McLean called the question of
Black people’s role in society “more a matter of taste than of law.” Despite
Taney’s claims, McLean showed that states had recognized Black people as
citizens, and the United States had recognized prior subjects of Spain,
France, and Mexico as citizens in treaties.15
14
15
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Although it is not straightforward to read the political affiliations of
justices appointed in a period of great partisan shift, it is notable that both
Curtis and McLean were associated with the Whig Party and then with the
Republican Party. Their dissents were shaped in part by a developing antislavery constitutionalism that found its home among former Whigs and
Liberty Party members who became influential in the Republican Party.
This anti-slavery constitutionalism had been based in an originalist claim that
the Constitution was anti-slavery, but politicians had steered away from those
moorings over the early nineteenth century. Constitutional history thus
needed to be righted toward a “freedom national” assumption that made
slavery local, and, they hoped, transitory. This reading of revolutionary
history starkly contrasted with Taney’s, as did their understanding of
historical change. Still, their openness to discrimination in many forms, and
their focus upon slavery rather than equal rights, lays them open to Professor
Chin’s well-taken points about the limits of their egalitarianism and the
persistence of white supremacist assumptions after emancipation, even as
their alternative reading of past history exposes Taney’s position as a pole
among several mid-century positions.16
Consider the sharp contrast between Taney’s support for slavery and the
anti-slavery perspective of the man who succeeded him on the Supreme
Court in 1864, Chief Justice Salmon Chase. Prior to his time on the Supreme
Court, Chase was a rising figure within Ohio’s Liberty Party and one of the
most prominent anti-slavery lawyers in the country. Although Chase
accepted limitations on the federal government’s ability to intervene where
slavery was protected by state law, he firmly believed that the Constitution
acknowledged the personhood of enslaved individuals and by extension,
protected the legal rights of free Black people. He spent much of his early
legal career utilizing the Constitution as an anti-slavery document. In Jones
v. Van Zandt, the case of an Ohio abolitionists who was sued for assisting
escaped slaves on the Underground Railroad, Chase even argued that the
Constitution’s Fugitive Slave Clause acknowledged the personhood of
enslaved individuals. Noting that the Clause opens with the language “No
person held to service or labor,” Chase insisted that “Under the
[C]onstitution, all the inhabitants of the United States are, without
exception, persons—persons, it may be, not free,—persons, held to service,
—persons who may migrate, or be imported, but still persons . . . .” For
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Chase, the fact that the Constitution expressly acknowledged persons and
not slaves mattered, even if Taney was unwilling to admit it.17
According to Chase, if enslaved individuals were considered persons for
the purposes of re-enslavement, they must also be considered persons who
were entitled to due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. In the case
of John Van Zandt, a group of kidnappers stopped him on a road north of
Cincinnati. Seven Black individuals were taken from his wagon, transported
across state lines into Kentucky and jailed without a formal process. Chase
argued that unless it could be “shew[n] that no process of law, at all, is the
same thing as due process of law, it must be admitted that the act which
authorizes seizure without process, is repugnant to a constitution that
expressly forbids it.”18 From Chase’s perspective, the Fugitive Slave Act of
1793 was unconstitutional because it violated the due process rights of the
Black individuals who were kidnapped under its authority. Taney and his
fellow justices ultimately disagreed with Chase’s argument, laying the
groundwork for Dred Scott by insisting that the enslaved status of Black
individuals was always presumed (as Dr. Finkelman has previously noted),
but Chase held to his position. As the first Republican governor of Ohio,
Chase advocated for the passage of personal liberty laws to protect Black
Ohioans from what he viewed as unconstitutional kidnappings. In 1856, he
closed the state’s jails to would-be kidnappers and instituted fines for
individuals who were caught attempting to detain free Black people.
Although much of this work would be undone by Ohio Democrats in the
wake of the Dred Scott decision, Chase never abandoned his belief that Black
individuals were entitled to legal rights. He may have lost in court to Roger
Taney, but Chase never accepted Taney’s pro-slavery constitutionalism or
his narrow view of U.S. citizenship. If Taney’s views as Chief Justice deserve
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consideration for their long-term consequences, so too do his successors’.
Taney framed part of what became a robust argument within U.S. life.19
Furthermore, if we accept Taney’s decision as an accurate account of
history, we are not only dismissing the anti-slavery constitutionalism of the
Republican Party, we are dismissing the legal and political claims of a smaller
but in many ways even more interesting nineteenth century civil rights
movement. In recent years, historians have gained a greater appreciation for
the legal and political perspectives of free Black individuals and their radical
white allies. Many of these individuals, from Presbyterian minister Samuel
Cornish to abolitionist William Yates, articulated an inclusive vision of U.S.
citizenship prior to the Dred Scott decision. It was this vision of citizenship
and equal rights that underwrote but also went beyond anti-slavery
constitutionalism. As gradual emancipation spread across the northeastern
United States, Black people (many of whom saw themselves as Americans
even if Taney didn’t) joined forces with white allies to secure the passage of
personal liberty laws and fight the use of northern legal systems to kidnap
and enslave their peers. Through legal and extra-legal protest, newspaper
articles and conventions, these individuals placed claims upon the U.S legal
system and demanded that they be extended the very rights and privileges
that Taney sought to deny them. Accepting Taney’s decision as an accurate
portrayal of history requires dismissing the claims of this movement that has
been excavated in different ways by Martha Jones, Leslie Alexander,
Christopher Bonner, Kate Masur, Manisha Sinha, and many other
scholars.20
The legal and political claims of Black individuals provide important
context for understanding Taney's motivations in the mid-nineteenth
century. They fashioned arguments Taney had to respond to, not as an
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historian but as a legal advocate seeking to dismiss them from consideration.
Taney’s reactionary 1830s turn is often linked to his hatred of abolitionism.
Thus, it is no great leap to suggest that his later arguments should be read in
light not just of proto-Republican anti-slavery constitutionalism in the
dissents of McLean and Curtis but also of these vibrant legal claims of
equality and citizenship. Given Taney’s ongoing engagement in Maryland
life, it is intriguing to consider the role of people like the free Black man
Samuel Jackson, whose 1850s Maryland state case Martha Jones examined.
Black Marylanders who pressed the Jackson case believed “the Dred Scott
decision offered only one answer among many to questions about race and
rights,” drawing upon their long struggle to assert those rights under state
law.21 While Jones argues that Jackson and people in his situation were not
“citizens in an unqualified sense” under Maryland law, they were treated by
the state’s courts and legislature as people with a “bundle of rights,” not “the
people with ‘no rights’ that Roger Taney imaged them to be.”22 Taney’s
words did not reflect Black Maryland activists’ views, nor did Taney’s words
reflect their lived experience. Perhaps Taney wrote so passionately precisely
because he knew he entered a world being shaped by arguments he despised.
We need not take the expansive claims of Black activists and their allies as
factual statements about the nature of U.S. citizenship to understand that
their views could constitute a threat as anti-slavery spread after the U.S.Mexico War and the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850.23
Taney’s argument was shaped by people he disagreed with, and some of
them disagreed in quite different ways, not as anti-racists but as what we call
differentiated racists. This strand of racism distinguished anti-Black racism
from racism against other groups and deliberately separated Black people
from other non-whites, sometimes on the grounds of Black people’s nativity,
sometimes on their religious practices, sometimes on ethnological beliefs of
the racial similarities between Asians and Native peoples. While it is difficult
to perceive a moment when there was more support for Black rights than for
the rights of other non-white persons, such was essentially a default position
of much of the Republican Party between 1868 and 1892. Many
Republicans embraced anti-Chinese exclusion, anti-Catholicism, and settler
colonialism but almost all of them unified in support of civil and voting rights
acts targeted at Black people, even if some did so solely from self-interest.
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One clear example of this differentiation occurred during the debate over the
Naturalization Act of 1870, which carved out a special exception for Black
people based upon their race, while reasserting the exclusion of other nonwhite peoples. Even further, the Naturalization Act’s sections five and six
were attacks on immigrant voting in cities over 20,000 people, motivated by
Republicans’ loss of New York State in the 1868 presidential election. Those
sections empowered federal judges to appoint supervisors of registration and
marshals to appoint special deputies to preserve order. Senator William
Stewart of Nevada led Republican efforts for the Fifteenth Amendment and
the 1870 Enforcement Act but denounced Charles Sumner’s effort to make
the Naturalization Act color-blind. Black enfranchisement was an “act of
justice” since Black people were “among us. This was his native land. He
was born here. He had a right to protection here. He had a right to the
ballot here. He was an American and a Christian, as much so as any of the
rest of the people of the country.”24 Chinese people, however, in Stewart’s
words were “pagans in religion, monarchists in theory.” Notably Lyman
Trumbull attacked these arguments as the type of racism only recently
deployed against Black people. But southern radical Republican Willard
Warner proposed only striking Black exclusion from the Naturalization Act.
Trumbull’s amendment to add Chinese people to the Naturalization Act lost
nine to thirty-one; notably, Trumbull argued for the amendment by
distinguishing deserving Black Americans from undeserving Africans on the
continent and in other countries. The yoking of Black protection with other
forms of exclusion shaped the nearly simultaneous 1870 Enforcement Act.
Over the next two decades, Republicans worked to sustain Black voting in
the south and hinder immigrant voting.25
The period after the Civil War produced numerous examples of people
who rejected Taney’s opinion in Dred Scott but might well have accepted
Taney’s opinion in Dow if they knew about it, precisely because they
distinguished between Black people and other non-whites. This reflected a
growing anti-Chinese racism among Republicans, especially but not solely in
western regions. In Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment debates,
Republicans repeatedly expressed frustration that the amendments were not
written solely to affect African Americans, often in wide ranging
24
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ethnographical claims about the distinctions between “the white race and the
black race and the yellow race and the red race.” In the Fifteenth
Amendment debates, Congressman Frederick Frelinghuysen said, “I am not
in favor of giving the rights of citizenship or the right of suffrage to either
pagans or heathen. I believe that the history of this country, and its laws as
well as the spirit of the people, declare just as clearly that this is a Christian
as a free country.” California Republicans like Horace Page led other
western Republicans into an embrace of anti-Chinese sentiment rooted not
in an intersectional but a differentiated racism even as they participated,
sometimes reluctantly, in 1880s Republican defenses of Black civil rights.
This juxtaposition of hostility toward Asians and defense of Black rights was
no regional exception in Republicanism, even if it was more pronounced in
the west. About Justice John Marshall Harlan’s decisions in Wong Kim Ark
and Plessy, Professor Chin writes that “Remarkably, then, decades after the
Fourteenth Amendment became law, a justice noted for his dedication to
civil rights could conclude that Asians born in the United States were not
citizens.” In the context of nineteenth century Republican ideology, there is
nothing particularly surprising about Harlan’s orientation, even though we
grant that it would be remarkable today. Harlan was undoubtedly a racist,
but did he see race in precisely the same ways that contemporary racists did?
The categories of white and non-white have their analytic uses and also their
contextual and analytic limits.26
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To turn briefly to indigenous peoples, in the post-Civil War Era, racism
against Black people and racism against indigenous people often seemed
sharply differentiated, at least for Republicans. As Elliott West noted, a party
that allied with Black soldiers in a war over the governance of land occupied
by Native peoples was not surprisingly committed to separating Black and
Native issues, even if individual members had intersectional racist beliefs. In
turn, as West emphasizes, Black and Native peoples responded from different
positions to Reconstruction-era government policies. In the West, African
American soldiers served as segregated but nevertheless uniformed soldiers
in wars against Native communities and were treated as (unequal) allies by
military officials who treated Indigenous peoples as enemies. None of this
either minimizes the mistreatment of Black soldiers and cadets like Henry O.
Flipper, nor the existence of reform-oriented elements among Republicans
on Native issues. But we see evidence of the disconnect between Black rights
and Native rights in two Wisconsin U.S. senators. James R. Doolittle,
originally a Republican, became a supporter of President Andrew Johnson
and a bitter opponent of most Reconstruction measures to protect Black
rights. On Native issues, Doolittle was partly responsible for adding “Indians
not taxed” to the Fourteenth Amendment as a way to ensure the exclusion
of California native peoples, but also was at times an advocate for local HoChunk and other Wisconsin native peoples; Doolittle was replaced by
Matthew Carpenter, a more reliable—if not always enthusiastic—supporter
of Black political rights, who led the fight to extend wartime in 1870 and
supported measures against the Ku Klux Klan but was notably less
sympathetic toward native peoples in the Upper Midwest. Research on the
Civil War Era has suggested that Republican-appointed agents in the
Missouri River agencies were harsher toward Native peoples than the often
pro-slavery Democrats they replaced. Like Harlan’s combination of Black
citizenship and Asian exclusion, none of this can be explained by Taney’s
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intersectional racism, but it all makes sense with an eye toward Republican
patterns of racist differentiation.27
Turning to frequent Republican opposition to immigration, we confront
a broader question of who did they believe constituted the category of white
people. Chin argues that Taney’s opinion is correct in part because there
was “no systematic denial of citizenship, deportation, deprivation of
property, disenfranchisement, or other degradation of White people, based
on race alone, because they were White people.” This elides a scholarly
debate about the extent to which Catholic and Jewish Europeans were
considered white. We ourselves do not hold with the scholars who emphasize
a hard division between whites and other allegedly non-white Europeans.
On the other hand, Chin’s argument about the rights that white people have
must wrestle with the question of who was white. The racial lists in Morton’s
catalogue of skulls collected in mid-century Philadelphia presents a
bewildering roster of races, some of which would no longer be considered
distinct by contemporary cultural constructions, others of which are grouped
together in unfamiliar ways in a “Caucasian” race that includes differentiated
Teutons, Celts, Pelasgic, Indostanic, Semitic, and Nilotic families, both
grouped together and distinguished from each other. None of this is
particularly unusual in the ethnographic writing of the era. We are in the
past; they did things differently there.28
Without embracing the argument that Irish or Italians or Jews had to
become white over time, one can see another form of differentiated
exclusionism in Protestant Republicans who embraced historic
discrimination against non-Protestants, including Republicans who
supported Black rights specifically based on their embrace of Protestantism.
For some Republicans, as Joshua Paddison argues, Black people’s capacity
lay specifically in their Protestantism, while “heathens” and—to some—
Catholics lacked the capacity for self-governance democracy demanded.
Therefore, Paddison argues, Reconstruction revealed “a different kind of
27
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limit to the Republican plan. Considering the postbellum Republicans’
insistence that ‘the negro’s hour’ had come, historians should have an
expansive view of all whose hour had not yet arrived.” This religiously
exclusivist vision helped shape the crafting of the Fifteenth Amendment,
when legislators, especially western Republicans, refused to add religion to
the groups of categories that could not be the basis for denial of the right to
vote.29
Explicit religious discrimination had a long history in the colonies.
Exclusions of Catholics from office holding or voting expanded during the
late colonial period that Taney purported to examine. Many were
overturned in revolutionary constitutions, but some remained. North
Carolina’s 1776 state constitution stated “that no person, who shall deny the
being of God or the truth of the Protestant religion . . . . shall be capable of
holding any office or place of trust or profit in the civil department within
this State.” Later amendments of the state constitution in 1835 permitted
Catholics but not atheists and non-Christians to hold office; a different, less
specific religious test against people who “shall deny the being of the
Almighty God” remains in the state constitution, though it is not enforced,
and such religious exclusions were later invalidated by the Supreme Court in
Torcaso v. Watkins. Religious-based exclusions of Catholics from office
holding endured in some northeastern states: in New York (via an oath) until
1806, in New Hampshire until 1877. Popular anti-Catholicism spread
widely in the 1840s and 1850s as Irish and German immigration rose, not
only in infamous attacks on monasteries and nunneries but also in the
American Party’s anti-immigrant platform, and the writings of Samuel
Morse and Lyman Beecher. Although the Republican Party formally
resisted anti-Catholicism and selected Abraham Lincoln in part for his
opposition to anti-immigrant movements, many Republicans had been
involved with Know Nothing organizing and considered the Catholic
Church and the slaveowners (along with Mormons) emblems of tyrannical
power that impeded democracy.30
Here we might see another motivation for Roger Taney to claim a unified
identity for white Christians. Taney, the first Roman Catholic appointed to
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the Supreme Court, was born into a Maryland Catholic slaveowning class
with deep roots in the colony but a perilous hold on rights. While Maryland’s
colonial history is associated with unusual status for Catholics under the
Calvert family, Catholic tolerance came under assault as early as the English
Civil War and began to be stripped away during the Glorious Revolution.
Catholics were barred from holding office in 1689, forbidden to practice law
in 1692, and forbidden from converting Protestant subjects in 1698. Special
taxes against “Papish” Irish immigrants were passed in 1699, 1704, and
1717. The first three royal governors were all ordered to tolerate all religions
“except Papists.” After a royal governor’s closing of a prominent Catholic
church in 1704, services were conducted exclusively in private homes. In
1715 the assembly stripped away parental rights of Protestant widows who
remarried Catholic men and barred Catholics from office holding, and in
1718 disfranchised Catholics. In 1744 the Governor’s Council barred
Catholics from the militia and from holding public weapons, and the lower
house of the assembly repeatedly passed even more stringent anti-Catholic
laws that were blocked by the upper house. This was the world that shaped
Taney’s parents. Taney’s father was sent to France and Belgium for a
religious education that was illegal in Maryland. Just as Taney was born in
1777, prominent Catholic revolutionary Charles Carroll helped legitimize
Catholic politics. It is no wonder that Taney looked back for a 1717 law
testimonial law that did not differentiate between white Christian
Marylanders, instead of to other laws from that era that sharply distinguished
between Catholic and Protestant white Marylanders when he constructed his
legal advocacy of white rights. While married to a Protestant, Taney
remained a practicing Catholic throughout his life and, unlike his wife, was
buried in a Catholic graveyard. Taney’s Catholicism helped shape the public
response to Dred Scott, with anti-Catholic editors arguing that the decision’s
errors were an alleged Catholic desire to bow to authority, while some
Catholic editors argued that the decision’s uncertain fit with doctrine
suggested the opposite, that Catholics could distinguish between their
commitments to Rome and to the Constitution.31
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The ecumenical white Christian identity that slowly developed in
Maryland and other states became central to the Democratic Party’s
emerging racial vision as it cemented an alliance of expansionist slaveowners
and northern working people, eventually including vast numbers of Catholic
immigrants from Ireland. Taney’s racism, one that centered whites versus
non-whites, was meaningful in a party that sought to bring together Catholics
and Protestants, U.S.-born voters and recent immigrants, against a Whig
Party identified with a long-resident Protestant population. Democrats
needed an ecumenical white identity politics, and Taney espoused a
Democratic vision, and perhaps even a Democratic vision shaped by his own
experience as a Maryland Catholic.
In this context, we might consider a question that sits behind Professor
Chin’s paper: What rights did white men have that white men were bound
to respect? The first answer, and one that that Professor Chin discusses early
on but does not dwell upon, lies in enslavability and actual legal enslavement.
This argument, while powerful, implies a shift with the Reconstruction
Amendments that sits uneasily with Professor Chin’s broader argument. The
answer Professor Chin emphasizes is that they had the right not to be
discriminated against as white men. While true, it is unclear exactly what this
adds up to, given that white men were discriminated against based on
religion or class and other factors; in the postbellum United States, when
chattel slavery was no longer legal, what protection did their whiteness
provide?
The range of exclusions goes far beyond Chin’s statement that
“individual white persons and families also suffered accident, misfortune, and
unfair treatment at the hands of the government.”32 In fact, vast numbers of
white Southerners were disfranchised in the southern states. In Virginia,
voting for governor stayed above 200,000 in every general election between
1881 and 1893, peaking at 284,000 in 1889; but after late century
disfranchisement, total voting in 1913 fell to 72,000, even though the
population had grown by 400,000 people between 1890 and 1910. J.
Morgan Kousser estimated that twenty-five percent of white Virginians were
disfranchised in this period; that pales beside the sixty percent of white
Louisianans that Kousser estimates were disfranchised by measures that
disfranchised even more Black men.33 This was a marked change from the
world of Roger Taney, when universal white enfranchisement was
32
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necessarily tied to near-universal Black disfranchisement; consider the 1821
New York constitution and the 1838 Pennsylvania constitution. In Jim
Crow, the directions reversed; white disfranchisement was necessary (at least
in theory) to achieve Black disfranchisement. This may be a sorry distinction
to make, in terms of our understanding of injustice and U.S. history, but it
reminds us of the importance of historical context. While scholarly
interpretations differ, many consider white disfranchisement to be an
important goal of the economic elites who wrested control of southern state
Democratic parties and feared poorer white alliances with Readjusters,
Populists, Fusionists, and other critics of the economic order. In northern
cities, before and after the war, the consolidating bourgeoisie that Sven
Beckert studied campaigned against voting rights for poorer whites, winning
prohibitions against non-citizen voting and laws that discouraged voting by
people illiterate in English. The leading historian of voting rights argues that
the Fifteenth Amendment “led southern Democrats to resurrect class, rather
than racial, obstacles to voting, a resurrection that was altogether compatible
with the conservative views and interests of many of the landed, patrician
whites who were the prime movers of disfranchisement.”34 Class disappears
entirely from Professor Chin’s telling, even though class shaped a great deal
of the exclusions and retractions of the period.35
It is true that these white men lost the vote for reasons other than their
whiteness, but what precisely does that tell us about the question of what
rights white men had as white men, other than the confidence that their
exclusion, when it came, would come upon some basis other than their race?
After the Reconstruction Amendments, Black Americans were disfranchised
by racially neutral acts as well, raising questions about whether the
categorical distinction that Chin makes between Black and white exclusions
holds true, at least for voting rights post-1870. Chin’s categorical distinction
may, however, be far more descriptive of explicitly discriminatory laws
against Asians, Native peoples, and others. It is important to note that our
argument about voting rights has less power in other areas of discrimination,
with more explicitly racist laws.
In our invocation of the post-Civil War break between racially specific
and racially neutral legislation directed against Black people, we raise a final
point of context and contingency. To what degree does Taney explain
antebellum U.S. history and to what degree does he explain the broad sweep
34
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of U.S. history? As Chin extends his reading beyond Taney’s death, Chin’s
paper persuasively captures the endurance of racism and, more surprisingly,
of Taney’s reputation. Some historical narratives undoubtedly convey too
sharp a break in the post-Civil War United States, as if the past had been
erased. Others undoubtedly suggest too clear a connection between the
Reconstruction Amendments and the work they were put to after World War
II, as if the half century of Jim Crow were an exception, as if the post-World
War II Supreme Court was not behaving creatively in its own right. To the
degree that Chin’s paper undermines those simplistic narratives, we agree.
Where we diverge is on the meaning and extent of Reconstruction.
While it is easy to overstate Reconstruction’s significance or its
representativeness, the specificity of the events of emancipation and
Reconstruction matter a great deal. The claim that Reconstruction did not
make impossible Jim Crow is true but not revealing. A legal realist can accept
the thinness of all constitutional guarantees and parchment barriers. That
Reconstruction could not foreclose a different generation’s defeat says much
less than it first seems, once we consider the ways that other constitutional
guarantees have crumbled in the face of opposition, as well as the rights that
have not yet crumbled but may soon. No guarantee can survive the standard
of irrevocability.
Reconstruction dramatically transformed the lives not only of enslaved
African Americans but also of free Black people in terms of family formation,
property acquisition, communal institution building, political power,
educational attainment, and control over leisure, broadly defined. This
absolute change in conditions, tied to the transformation of status, is true
even though it is also true that disparities between Black and white people
remained and remain profound. Arguments about continuities across
emancipation run aground on the simple facts of what slavery was and what
it meant to be considered property under the law, not to mention how slave
property created forms of national political power that could not be quite
replicated under emancipation. The elimination of chattel property rights in
human beings fundamentally transformed U.S. history, even as it did not
create a solution to other, important problems of discrimination and
disparity.
At a broad level, Reconstruction perhaps concluded in the 1890s as a
new regime of disfranchisement and segregation, constructed on prior
practices, expanded over the south and, to different degrees, the nation. The
confluence of congressional defeat, Supreme Court failure, Anglo-American
intellectual embraces of new scientific racism, corporate creation of spaces to
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be segregated at railroad stations, Democratic fears of Populist and Fusionist
alliances between white and Black southerners, urban reformers’ fears of the
voting power of new waves of immigrants, the spread of governance
strategies developed in the west then the Philippines and Puerto Rico, and
new northern political coalitions helped usher in a new moment of modernist
segregation. This segregation proceeded differently not only because the
world was different but also because the Constitution was different. The
facially neutral language of disfranchisement is at once farcical and
meaningful, farcical in the way that it thinly disguised what was obviously
racially motivated legislation, meaningful in the way that it also permitted
and even encouraged retraction of rights for white people under the guise of
retraction of rights for Black people.
Chin’s paper successfully breaks the Black-white binary in U.S. history,
and it is reasonable to suggest that we have defensively argued in favor of
both our discipline and our own areas of study, which emphasize the denials
of rights and power to Black people. Our very defensiveness may be sincere
evidence of the power of Chin’s work to draw nineteenth century scholars
focused on Black-white or white-indigenous relations to a consideration of
early Asian history in the US and to early racial formations that did not solely
turn on a Black-white-Native trinity. If Professor Chin’s conclusions are not
by themselves sufficient as a history of the period, they are a necessary
directive to conduct the kind of research that would allow for a fuller multiracial history of law and practice, a history we urgently need, a history that
his scholarship makes possible.

